Untitled Document
Data loss prevention. It's come to be one of the terms that we have become
unusually familiar with. Data loss prevention isn't about the outright cessation
of the loss of personal records; it's about reducing the risk to an acceptable
level. There isn't a quadrant in health, finance, construction or any other
sector that doesn't have some measure of risk. When the frequency and cost of
data breaches outweigh other security concerns, it is time to reassess the risks.
If we take a look at 2008 we can clearly see that it was a year of unprecedented
events. From a security perspective let's look at data breaches. The amount
of records containing sensitive personal information that were involved in data
breaches (in the U.S.) in the last three years also falls under the "unprecedented"
category -- approximately 250 million records. Last year alone 38 million records
accounted for part of that number. In 2007 there were over 127 million records
involved in data breaches.
A point to keep in mind is that the number of records involved in data breaches
are either under-reported or, in some cases, not reported at all. A trend that
I've seen is that corporations are facing greater financial risk from insufficient
controls and unclear policies. Problems also arise when controls are put in
place before the policies are written or completed -- the controls are designed
to be put in place to enforce policies.
With respect to data loss, increasing penalties as well as increased transparency,
or at least opaqueness (limited transparency), are two paths that have been
cited time and again in regard to increasing corporate responsibility.
Another topic to consider is preventing breaches. Even in corporations that
have well-written policies and effective controls, the percentage of data breaches
that occur due to human error is still above 80 percent.
I'd like to take some time to dissect a data breach that occurred in 2008 which
involved the exposure/release of 4.2 million records. As in the aviation world,
when there is an accident it is referred to as a "chain of events"
or the "error chain." These terms simply mean that multiple factors,
rather than a single one, lead to an accident. The same can be said for security
incidents or such as data leakage. Take, for instance, the case of the Maine-based
Hannaford Brothers grocery stores. Let's look at this chain of events:
- The supermarket chain reported to Massachusetts Regulators that the scope
of the malware infections appears to be larger than anything that is remotely
possible. It is Hannaford's belief that a "trusted" source had physical
access to the servers.
- A trusted source with administrative remote or physical access to one or
more servers installed malicious software (malware) onto those servers.
- The malware intercepts customer card data and transmits that data outside
of the network to remote servers.
- WebSphere MQ, which is a popular network messaging carrier for ATM and credit
card transactions, does not encrypt this data by default. Since the traffic
is sent in clear text, it is easy to "sniff" and capture or transmit
this information.
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